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 1 
Summary 
Concepts such as creativity and innovation have never been more important 
than they are today. Increased innovativeness is believed to contribute to 
Europe’s competitiveness on the world market as well as sustainability and 
job creation within the union. According to the EU, the way to success is to 
set up ideal conditions for innovation and nurture creativity through political 
support.  
 
A patent pool is an arrangement where several rights holders assemble their 
patents and furthermore license the same as a package to the members of the 
pool, and/or to third parties willing to pay the royalty fee. Patent pools vary 
in their form and size and the motive behind them has evolved from the 
wish of avoiding litigation and accessing each others’ respectively patents, 
to more modern incentives with the primary focus of collecting all relevant 
patents within a certain technical area. 
 
From a competition law perspective, patent pools are in many ways 
perceived as promoters of innovation. Supposedly, pools reduce litigation 
costs, provide risk distribution and most importantly, clear the dense web of 
overlapping rights caused by the current patent system. These features all 
increase the incentives for and possibilities to innovate. However, pools are 
at the same time agreements between horizontal competitors and the 
collaboration can constitute collusive behavior, such as price fixing and 
collective bundling. The risk is that the pool increases royalty fees for 
licensees as well as foreclosures third party technologies. For this reason, 
patent pools are assessed by the Commission under Article 101 TFEU. 
 
This thesis questions whether competition policy is considerate enough to 
the special circumstances that surrounds agreements formed in the pooling 
context. By examining the policy, the author finds that the established 
safeguards can be questioned in terms of their efficiency. The reason for this 
is that the framework is shattered over several documents and the decisive 
distinctions are hard to perform. Also, the presumptions for what is and 
what is not an anti-competitive behavior can be criticized for not having the 
proposed effect in a pooling context.  
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Sammanfattning 
Begrepp som kreativitet och innovation har aldrig varit så viktiga som de är 
idag. Ökad innovationskraft tros bidra till Europas konkurrensförmåga på 
världsmarknaden liksom till hållbarhet och fler arbetstillfällen inom 
Unionen. Enligt EU nås framgång genom att skapa ideala förutsättningar för 
innovation och att främja kreativitet med politiskt stöd. 
 
En patentpool är ett arrangemang där ett flertal rättighetsinnehavare samlar 
sina patent och sedermera licenserar dessa som ett paket till 
poolmedlemmarna och/eller tredje man beredd att betala royaltyavgiften. 
Patentpooler varierar kraftigt i form och storlek och motivet bakom dem har 
utvecklats från önskan att undvika rättstvister och få tillgång till varandras 
respektive patent, till mer moderna incitament med huvudfokus på att samla 
alla relevanta patent inom ett tekniskt område. 
 
Från ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv uppfattas patentpooler som något 
som i många avseenden gynnar innovation. Pooler påstås kunna minska 
rättegångskostnader, distribuera risk mellan poolmedlemmarna och viktigast 
av allt, reda ut det ogenomträngliga nätet av överlappande rättigheter 
orsakat av dagens patentsystem. Dessa egenskaper leder alla till ökade 
incitament till och förutsättningar för innovation. Pooler är dock samtidigt 
avtal mellan horisontella konkurrenter varför samarbetet kan utgöra 
klandervärt beteende såsom en priskartell eller kopplingsförbehåll av typen 
bundling. Risken är att poolen leder till ökade royaltysatser för licenstagarna 
samt försvårar etablerings- och utvecklingsmöjligheterna för konkurrenter. 
Av denna anledning utvärderas patentpooler av Kommissionen inom ramen 
för artikel 101 FEUF. 
 
Denna uppsats ifrågasätter huruvida det konkurrensrättsliga regelverket är 
tillräckligt hänsynstagande till de speciella omständigheter som omger avtal 
slutna i poolingsammanhang. Genom att undersöka regelverket kommer 
författaren fram till att verkningskraften av de etablerade garantierna kan 
ifrågasättas. Anledningen till detta är att regelverket är splittrat mellan flera 
dokument och de avgörande distinktionerna är svåra att utföra. Dessutom 
kan presumtionerna för vad som utgör och inte utgör ett konkurrensvidrigt 
beteende kritiseras för att inte ha den effekt de tillskrivs i ett 
poolingsammanhang. 
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Preface 
Looking back, the author of this thesis has had a constant, close to 
pathological, need to round off her written works with clichés, rhetorical 
questions or just, in her opinion, grand words. The rationale for this 
behavior can be found in the desire for leaving the reader with a sense of 
reflection and depth. Most of the times the cover up of a rickety analysis 
was probably closer to the truth.  
 
Sitting here, writing the last lines to what possibly is the end of an academic 
career, the pressure for a catchy finish has never been more urgent. For this 
reason, the author will challenge herself to do the impossible.  
And that is, without any frills, to finish the sentence.  
 
Full stop. 
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Abbreviations 
AmCham   American Chamber of Commerce 
 
CFI The European Court of First 
Instance 
  
DOJ   United States Department of Justice 
 
ECJ   European Court of Justice 
 
EU   European Union  
 
FTC   Federal Trade Commission 
 
IPR   Intellectual Property Right 
 
ISO International Organization for 
Standardization 
 
JV   Joint Venture 
 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development 
 
R & D   Research and Development 
 
SSO   Standard Setting Organization 
 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union 
 
TTBER Technology Transfer Block 
Exemption Regulation 
 
TT Guidelines Technology Transfer Guidelines 
 
US   United States of America 
 
WHO   World Health Organization 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Concepts such as creativity and innovation have never been more important 
than they are today. The intense economic globalization has raised the 
question of Europe’s competitiveness towards other world actors. From an 
EU perspective, it is believed that increasing the innovativeness will 
contribute to greater competitiveness as well as sustainability and job 
creation, aims that, in the wake of the financial crisis and subsequent 
economic slowdown, are particularly prioritized. The way to success is by 
setting up ideal conditions for innovation and nurture creativity through 
political support.1 Simultaneously, the EU highlights competition as a factor 
creating the best conditions for innovation as it stimulates entrepreneurship 
and improves efficiency. For this reason, strong competition policy and 
enforcement are essential building blocks in the reconstruction of the 
economy.2  
 
The core values of innovation and competition are two expressions of the 
same object, namely the wish to secure a workable competition within the 
internal market to consumers’ welfare and to the benefit of the European 
society as whole. In most cases, the protection of one entails the protection 
of the other. However, experience tells us there are situations where it has to 
be determined which of the two values and the legal framework that comes 
with it, is to prevail over and to the detriment of the other.  
 
The granting of intellectual property rights to an innovator offers an 
example. The rights holder, often a private actor, is granted the exclusive 
right to exploit the innovation and can in this respect be seen as holding a 
monopoly on this invention, protected by the freedom of contract to license 
as he pleases. At the same time, competition law endeavors to create a 
market where no player is able to, independently or in collaboration with 
others, act autonomously of its competitors. 
 
Patent pools bring the matter to a head. Here, not one but two or more 
actors, with the exclusivity derived from their IPRs, join forces and begin to 
act together on the market. The warning bells of competition law 
immediately start to ring. However, when considering that these 
arrangements could help loosen up stagnated markets where overlapping 
patent rights preclude all action, the pools could potentially work in favor of 
competition. The key question is whether the collaboration has such pro-
competitive motives or effects or if it is really an arrangement with the 
scheme of strengthen strong rights even further.  
                                                
1 COM(2009) 442 final, p. 3. Barroso, Welcome Speech for the European Year 2009 of 
Creativity and Innovation. 
2 SWD(2012) 141 final, p. 3.  
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The area of patent pools is not regulated by law but by some Commission’s 
guidelines. Although guidelines are not binding per se, they offer great 
insight in the Commission’s general view on patent pools as well as 
indicates how pools would be assessed should they be before the court. 
When analyzing the current policy, a natural starting point is therefore to 
examine and question these guidelines. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the current and recently proposed 
competition law policy towards patent pools in order to answer the 
following questions: 
 
− What conditions must be met for patent pools to be compatible with 
EU antitrust legislation?  
− Are the established safeguards efficient in neutralizing the 
anticompetitive risks associated with patent pools?  
− Does EU competition law policy sufficiently promote the formation 
of patent pools?  
 
Should the answer to the two latter questions be in the negative, the essay 
will ultimately offer an opinion on what actions could be taken for the 
answer to change to the opposite. 
 
1.3 Method and Material 
The subject of this thesis is approached by using a legal dogmatic method. 
In this aspect I refer to the investigation of applicable law in a specific area, 
namely that of patent pools, in order to determine how the rules are 
composed and how they can be expected to be applied by a court of law. 
Apart from current regulations and the Guidelines on the application of 
Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements, I’ve 
examined preparatory works in the form of official documents leading up to 
the recently proposed framework.  
 
As case law dealing with the matter is practically absent and closely related 
cases are many and diverse,3 I’ve chosen to complement my study by also 
examining some competitions authorities’ decisions, as these are, although 
not redundant in their amount, more common.  
 
Doctrine has further been investigated to earn a theoretical point of view. 
The authors, Carlson, Lerner, Merger and Tirole to mention a few, are 
chosen on the premise that they are the leading names on the subject. 
Additionally, the study ordered by the Commission and carried out by 
                                                
3 Regibeau and Rockett, p. 1. 
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Regibeau and Rockett has also been frequently used. In this regard it should 
be mentioned that the literature dealing with the subject historically have 
focused on pools as a legal institution and that there is almost no empirical 
work on the matter. Also, some aspects of patent pools have gotten more 
attention by the scholars than others. For this reason, although the thesis 
attempts to paint the whole picture of the framework for patent pools, the 
different parts might not always be so balanced as one might wish. 
 
Although this thesis does not aspire to be a comparative study, recourse will 
be taken to the US. The reason for this is that vast amount of the literature 
on the subject is written by US scholars discussing the American 
framework. Also, decisions from US competition authorities will be 
examined as the amount of material from the European Commission is 
limited. When mentioning US guidelines it is with the intention to put the 
European policy in perspective rather than to compare it with its US 
counterpart. Since comparative method is not used per se a more thorough 
description of US competition law will not be accounted for.4 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
When questioning the rationale for, and efficiency of, the current framework 
it is important to understand why the law looks the way it does. Since many 
of the provisions are founded on economic theory, the thesis will apply 
some law and economics aspects. The intention is, where possible, to 
identify which economic considerations the legislator has taken into account 
when creating the current norms, and whether these considerations can be 
questioned. The amount of theoretical economic literature is extensive, 
especially since a newfound interest in patent pools has arisen as a response 
to the intense theorizing about patent thickets and royalty stacking. The 
empirical literature however, just like the legal doctrine, is still quite 
sparse.5 For this reason, the literature will offer help for understanding the 
rationale for the provisions, but will be of limited importance when 
evaluating the efficiency of the norms.  
 
Furthermore, even though a more comprehensive law and economics 
approach, where the incentives and disincentives for companies to 
participate in patent pools were properly examined, would be of interest this 
must however be delimited. Some incentives will be revealed in the thesis’ 
section on historical and modern patent pools but then with the aim of 
describing the diversity of motives for patent pooling rather than studying 
the companies’ actual business considerations. 
 
                                                
4 For further reading, see Antitrust Law Developments 7th ed. by ABA (2012) for a general 
overview or Antitrust law: an analysis of antitrust principles and their application by 
Phillip E. Areeda (1978) or The Antitrust Enterprise - Principle and Execution by Herbert 
Hovenkamp (2008) for a more analytical approach. 
5 Lerner, Strojwas and Tirole, p. 617. 
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As earlier mentioned, the attention of this thesis evolves around the 
competition law concerns of agreements setting up patent pools. Contract 
law specific questions will be left aside although a complete avoidance of 
contractual aspects would be impossible when examining the licensing 
agreement. The same can be said about intellectual property law. The latter 
will only briefly be touched upon when discussing the specific nature of 
patents as property and the difficulties this entail. 
 
The thesis will exclusively investigate the European legal framework on a 
Union level. Due to the harmonization of competition law, national 
competition legislation basically reflects union in full, and a comparison 
between the different countries would therefore be of small value. In 
addition, as companies involved in patent pooling often are big players on 
the market and active in several countries, they are likely of fulfilling the 
trade criterion. This fact also supports the investigation of law on a union 
level.  
 
All types of intellectual property can be subject for cross-licensing or 
pooling. This is the reason for why the European Commission has chosen to 
use the wider concept technology pools in their documents. This thesis will 
nevertheless be limited to discuss pools of patents. Patents have throughout 
the history shown to be the most common subject for pooling and are 
especially interesting to analyze as society stands a lot to gain, and loose, 
from the creation and operation of them. 
 
The reader of this thesis is assumed to have certain knowledge about 
competition law as well as a basic understanding for intellectual property 
and contract law. Even so, it should at the outset be mentioned that this 
thesis is of extensive technical nature. This is inevitable when examining 
law dealing with patents, as legal and technical aspects are closely 
intertwined. In addition, competition law adds economic aspects on this, 
making the picture even more complex. As the thesis in some parts will feel 
far from a traditional legal analysis, bear in mind that this complexity is the 
reality for judges and competition law authorities applying the framework. 
 
1.5 Outline 
Chapter two will start out by defining some principal and to them closely 
related concepts vital for the competitive evaluation of patent pools. In the 
same chapter a brief description of the evolution of the phenomenon is also 
offered.  
 
Following this, chapter three discusses the pro-competitive aspects, in terms 
of promoting innovation, of patent pools. Here, the theoretical position that 
patent pools in general is a pro-competitive phenomenon, is laid out. This 
presumption will be of importance throughout the essay. 
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The major section of this thesis, the analysis of the framework, then follows 
in two parts. Chapter four starts out by investigating the pooling agreement, 
i.e. the agreement between rights holders to pool their patents and the 
conditions for their mutual collaboration. Chapter five then deals with the 
licensing agreement, the agreement between the pool and third party 
regarding the licensed package of technology. Although the two in practice 
most likely are seen as one, and by this in possession of many common 
features, the distinction between them are made for pedagogical reasons as 
different provisions apply.  This means that some general aspects initially 
clarified in chapter four concern both types of the agreement whereas 
chapter five will focus solely on the special characteristics of the licensing 
agreement. Both of the two chapters will culminate in a discussion on the 
rationale and justification of applicable provisions.  
 
Ultimately, the summarized findings as well as answers to the questions 
initially posed will be presented in chapter six.  
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2 The patent pool 
2.1 What is a patent pool? 
There is no universally accepted definition on what constitutes a patent 
pool. One description, frequently used in US doctrine, is that of Klein, 
explaining a patent pool as: 
...the aggregation of intellectual property rights which are the subject of cross-
licensing, whether they are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or through 
some medium, such as a joint venture, set up specifically to administer the patent 
pool.6 
In simpler terms, a patent pool is an arrangement where several rights 
holders, each in possession of a patent, collect these in either one of the 
participating companies or in a new independent entity created for this 
purpose. The assembled group of patents is furthermore licensed as a 
package to the members of the pool and/or to third parties willing to pay the 
royalty fee. The participants agree on the terms and fees for the package 
license and establish the valuation mechanism for the dividing of royalties.7 
Patent pools vary in their form and size ranging from simple arrangements 
between a few parties to industry-wide institutions with dozens of members 
and an immense number of patents.8 Despite this, patent pools share, 
according to Merges, one fundamental characteristic: 
…they provide a regularized transactional mechanism in place of the statutory 
property rule baseline which requires an individual bargain for each transaction.9 
The closely related term cross-licensing refers, as the name suggests, to a 
reciprocal arrangement whereby two parties, through two independent 
licensing contracts, grant and receive licenses to each others’ patents.10 In 
contrast to the patent pool, the idea is not to license the patents to third 
parties but to get access to the other party’s patent which might be crucial 
for the possibility to produce, manufacture or sell a certain product. Instead 
of ceasing production or, in the case of possible infringements engage in 
costly litigation, the rights holders join forces through a cross-license and 
are able to carry on with their business.11  
 
History tells us that both types of agreements, patent pools and cross-
licenses, have been the form for pooling collaboration. As shall be 
discovered, US antitrust law deals with the two as a group and the 
                                                
6 Klein, p. 4. 
7 Shapiro, p. 127. 
8 Merges (1999), p. 18. 
9 Merges (1996), p. 1342. 
10 Carlson, p. 369. 
11 Shapiro, p. 127. 
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contractual solution, cross-license or patent pool, is then of minor 
importance.12 
In contrast, the distinction is important in the EU as it has effects of 
substantial law. The categorization between the two should therefore be 
born in mind. 
 
2.2 Closely related concepts   
2.2.1 R&D and Joint ventures 
There are other forms of collaborations with features resembling those of 
patent pools.  Joint ventures as well as more comprehensive R & D projects 
can be seen as forms of pooling.13 These types of collaboration differ from 
pooling in that the agreement is entered into ex ante with the aim of 
developing the product or technology, or carrying out the project, together. 
When entering into a pooling agreement this is made ex post the 
development, when the innovation already exists. JV and R & D are not 
covered by the same framework as the one for patent pools. For the joint 
licensing of cooperative R & D-results this has always been controversial.14 
However, when a JV collects patents and later engages in licensing of them 
to third parties, and the activity is not linked to production by the JV, this is 
considered to be a patent pool.15  
 
2.2.2 Standards 
Standard setting is another form of activity that co-exists and to large degree 
also cooperates with patent pools. A technology standard is a norm or 
demand established on a national or international level,16 which describes a 
technical solution or certain technological criteria, methods, processes or 
routines. The standard is often specified in a formal document or exists as a 
de facto standard where a company’s product or technology has become so 
generally accepted that others choose to adapt to it. The general purpose of 
standardization is to facilitate for consumers as well as to coordinate 
development and rationalize production. A well-known example of 
standardization is the industry for car components, another the telecom 
business where participating companies are trying to achieve compatibility 
on a global market through a common framework.17 
 
Many of the modern patent pools are creating or supporting a standard.18 
When the pool gives rise to a standard, this calls for additional concerns as it 
                                                
12 Carlson, p. 369. 
13 Lidgard, p. 291. 
14 Ullrich, p. 9. 
15 TT Guidelines, para 58. 
16 For example the GSM standard for mobile communications. 
17 Svenskt näringsliv, p. 27.  
18 See for example the DVD-3 Business Review Letter.  
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means that the pool owns and controls those essential patents required to 
carry out the technology behind the standard. By doing this, the market 
power of the pool is considerably stronger. 
 
2.3 Nature of pooled patents 
As shall be discovered, the pooled patents’ relationship to each other as well 
as to patents outside the pool is of fundamental importance from an antitrust 
perspective. A distinction is made between competing and complementary 
patents as well as between essential and non-essential patents. 
 
2.3.1 Competing and complementary patents 
Regarding the relationship between patents within the pool, competing 
patents or substitute patents are patents that are substitutable for a consumer 
on the market, thereby making the rights holders competitors on that same 
market. Competing patents appear when an inventor introduces a totally 
new product or process or invents around existing patents by 
modifications.19  
 
The opposite of the above-mentioned are the complementary patents. Here, 
the rights holders each have patents that are independently crucial for the 
consumer as access to all complementary patents is necessary for anyone 
interested in exploiting the underlying product or process.20 The rights 
holders are not seen as competitors on the same market because the patents 
are not substitutable. Complementary patents can also be blocking patents. 
This blocking situation emerges when a licensee develops or improves an 
already patented product or process further. The improvement patent can 
earn protection but will be seen as subservient to the original pioneer patent. 
The improvement patent cannot be exploited without infringing upon the 
pioneer patent and likewise the pioneer patent cannot be developed in the 
form of the improvement patent without permission.21 When the 
improvement patent and the pioneer patent are in the hands of different 
rights holders this can lead to hold-up problems if the rights holders cannot 
settle. The case Line Material22 offers a practical example. The dominant 
patent was in this case a dropout fuse cutout, a product useful for protecting 
an electric circuit from the dangers caused by a short circuit or other 
overload. The subservient patent covered a housing suitable for the cutout. 
Dropout fuse cutouts could be used without any housing whereas the 
housing would be useless absent the cutout. 
 
                                                
19 Carlson, p. 365. 
20 Carlson, p. 365. 
21 Carlson, p. 363. 
22 United States v Line Materials Co. 
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2.3.2 Essential and non-essential patents  
The second distinction regards the pooled patents position towards the 
market as a whole. Essential patents are patents that are necessary for the 
production of the underlying product or process and for which there are no 
substitutes neither inside nor outside of the pool. Non-essential patents are 
determined negatively. Essential patents are by default also 
complementary.23 The same is not true for the opposite; technologies can be 
complementary without being essential, for example when it is possible to 
produce the product without access to the other party’s product but access to 
it enables better or cheaper products.24 
 
2.4 The evolution of patent pools 
In order to get a more hands-on understanding of what a patent pools are 
and the reason for their being, the following section offers a short 
description of some prominent examples of pools representing the evolution 
of them. As shall be seen, the motives for their creation vary, as do their 
instigators. 
 
2.4.1 Historical patent pools 
The phenomenon of rights holders collaborating through pooling 
arrangements is far from new. The history of patent pools dates back to the 
19th century, not long after patent as a statute had been introduced in 
national legislation over the world.  
 
The first known patent pool was created in 1856 between three American 
sewing machine manufacturers, I.M. Singer Co., Wheeler & Wilson Co. and 
the Grover & Baker Co., who after years of suing each other for patent 
infringements decided to join forces by creating the pool The Sewing 
Machine Combination.25 The main motive for the agreement, common for 
many of the early pools, was the wish to avoid further litigation26 and the 
pool embodied the settlement. An additional advantage was the access to 
each other’s technology. When all the patented technologies could be put 
into a single machine, the members were able to design and market the first 
sewing machines for home use.27 Also, the pooling and licensing of the 
patents as one single package gave the pool members freedom to decide the 
royalty fees collectively instead of competitively.28 The Sewing Machine 
Combination sustained prices on an artificially high level. This was shown 
                                                
23 TT Guidelines, para 216. 
24 Regibeau and Rockett, p. 18. 
25 Serafino, p. 3.  
26 Merges (1999), p. 19.  
27 Serafino, p. 3. 
28 The federal legislation in the US, the Sherman Antitrust Act, prohibiting cartels was not 
put in force until 1890. 
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by the fact that I.M. Singer on the day for the expiration of the patents had 
to cut prices by 50 % in order to compete on the open market.29 
 
Governmental powers have also shown interest in the formation of patent 
pools, sometimes through encouragement and sometimes even by use of 
force. In 1917 two airplane manufacturers, Glenn Curtiss and the Wright 
brothers, held most of the essential patents for components on the relevant 
market. Due to their position, they were able to charge high royalty fees for 
their technology. Both of the companies guarded their position through 
intense litigation against each other as well as other manufacturers.30 The 
situation at hand regarding the validity and ownership of important 
aeronautical patents was chaotic and resulted in serious delay in the 
manufacture and development of the aircraft industry just as the US was 
preparing to enter World War I.31 For this reason, a National advisory 
committee recommended the formation of a patent pool, the Manufacturer’s 
Aircraft Association, that would create a cross-license between all aircraft 
manufacturers. The pool initially involved eleven members but pretty soon 
expanded to include all manufacturers of aircraft purchased by the federal 
government. The pool solved the situation with a stagnated market in order 
for more planes to be manufactured. Another effect of the pool was the 
impact on royalty fees as prices dropped drastically low. The price 
reductions were however to large degree a response to the governmental 
threats to acquire the patents by eminent domain.32 
 
The US government was also a strong force behind the pool Radio 
Corporation of America established in 1917. Here, the main motivation for 
the pool was to terminate foreign control over the US radio industry and by 
this excluding foreign manufacturers and operators from a key military 
technology. The company GE was therefore encouraged by Franklin D. 
Roosevelt through the Navy, to buy out the US branch of the foreign-owned 
company Marconi and pool patents from several companies such as 
Marconi, American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T), Telefunken and 
Westinghouse. The RCA and GE then entered into a cross-license 
agreement, respectively granting each other access to their radio patents.33 
 
2.4.2 Modern patent pools 
As time has passed and with the intense development of the technological 
industry, new incentives for pooling technologies have been exposed. Patent 
pools have grown to become an economically significant institution. This is 
vouched for by Lerner and Tirole who mentions a recent estimate which 
                                                
29 Serafino, p. 3. 
30 Serafino, p. 15. 
31 Serafino, p. 16. 
32 Serafino, p. 16. 
33 Serafino, p. 17. 
 15 
suggest that sales in 2001 of devices based in whole or in part on pooled 
patents were at least 100 billion dollars.34 
 
While earlier pools was mainly motivated by the wish of avoiding litigation 
and accessing each others’ patents in order to resume or start production, 
one of the more modern incentives has been to collect all the relevant 
patents and other IPRs within a certain technical area in a pool. The reason 
for doing this is that the members then can share the litigation costs as well 
as royalties. The assumption is that consumers are more likely to license the 
package if all technologies necessary are offered. In addition, for companies 
interested in creating a standard, this solution is especially attractive. An 
example of these more modern motives is the MPEG-LA patent portfolio35 
established in 1997. The pool was created with the purpose of offering a 
one-stop shop for necessary licenses for the use of MPEG-2 technology – a 
video compression technology making videos available over lower 
bandwidth carriers due to easier and faster transmission. The technology had 
two years earlier been adopted as a standard and was recognized by the 
ISO.36 A similar example is Bluetooth technology that originally started out 
as a patent pool project in 1998. The technology allows the interconnection 
of mobile devices through short-range radio frequency band. The Bluetooth 
Special Interest Group37 owns and markets their brand as well as licenses 
the technology to more than 7000 companies involved in the making, 
manufacturing and selling Bluetooth-enabled products. The pool has as its 
mission statement to: 
…strengthen the Bluetooth brand by empowering pool members to collaborate and 
innovate, creating the preferred wireless technology to connect diverse devices.38  
In other words, the pool’s intention is to establish a standard and allow easy 
ways of access to the technology.39 The standard setting aspect’s importance 
in the pool formation is supported by Layne-Farrar and Lerner who declare 
that nearly all modern patent pools have formed out of standard setting 
efforts.40 
 
Another modern phenomenon is the open pools where the rights to a 
technology, often not in the right holders’ core business, is released free to 
contribute to the spread of knowledge and further development. An example 
of this was the pool Open Invention Network41, established 2005 for the 
development of the operative system Linux. Linux is a free software and 
open source document where the source code is available for anyone to 
download, modify and re-issue. The pool’s vision is to ensure: 
                                                
34 Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 158. 
35 See www.mpegla.com. 
36 Serafino, p. 17. 
37 See www.bluetooth.org. 
38 www.bluetooth.org/en-us/members/about-sig-overview. 
39 Serafino, p.18. 
40 Layne-Farrar and Lerner, p.294. 
41 See www.openinventionnetwork.com. 
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…the openness of the Linux source code, so that programmers, equipment vendors, 
ISVs and institutions can invest in and use Linux with less worry about intellectual 
property issues. Its licensees can use the company’s patents to innovate freely. This 
makes it economically attractive for companies that want to repackage, embed and 
use Linux to host specialized services or create complementary products. 42 
The motive behind the pool must be understood as facilitating innovation 
for anyone able to make use of the technology.43  
 
Patent pools are today well established in basic manufacturing and 
electronic industries, but have in recent years also started to conquer ground 
in the biotechnology related areas as a solution to patent issues.44 In the 
biomedicine area several pharmaceutical companies have collected patents 
in the UNITAID patent pool with the aim to facilitate access, increase 
supply and lower the prices of essential medicines against HIV/Aids, 
malaria and tuberculosis, in developing countries.45 UNITAID is a drug 
purchase facility created by a number of countries and hosted by WHO.46 
The development of biomedical patent pools as an area for future research 
was acknowledged by OECD in 2002.47 
 
Closely related are the pools covering agricultural technologies. One 
example is PIPRA, Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture,48 
an initiative founded in 2001, aimed at making agricultural technology more 
easily available for the development and distribution of subsistence crops 
into the developing world. PIPRA is exploring the possibilities for 
developing a patent pool to give biotech crop researcher greater freedom to 
operate. The belief is that creating a collective public IP asset base to make 
complementary technologies available should significantly reduce the 
transaction costs now associated with negotiations and help public sector 
researchers to obtain freedom to operate in crop biotechnology.49 
 
Where the evolution of pooling arrangements will head next, only future can 
tell. It is however clear that the area is under constant progress. A brand new 
initiative called the Intellectual Property Exchange (IPXI) markets itself as 
the world’s first financial exchange for non-exclusive licensing and trading 
of IPRs. IPXI offers their product, the Unit License Right (ULR), at market 
based prices and standardized terms.50 The aim is to increase transparency 
and efficiency on the market. The DOJ delivered a Business Review Letter 
in March 2013, stating that the lack of knowledge about the inherent 
uncertainties and potential competitive concerns associated with IPXI’s 
novel business model makes it too soon to conclude that the activities will 
not raise competitive concerns. The initiative has for this reason not been 
                                                
42 www.openinventionnetwork.com/about.php. 
43 Serafino, p. 28. 
44 Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 158. 
45 www.unitaid.eu. 
46 Serafino, p. 34. 
47 Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 158. 
48 See www.pipra.org. 
49 Serafino, p. 32.  
50 See www.ipxi.com. 
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cleared.51 Although IPXI is not a patent pool in the proper sense of the 
word, the initiative testifies about the industry’s curiosity in new forms of 
collaboration regarding IPRs. 
                                                
51 IPXI Business Review Letter. 
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3 Patent pools as promoters of 
innovation 
The competition law framework governing pools has the aim of ensuring 
that only welfare enhancing versions are formed. In the provisions, some of 
the pools potential advantages are accounted for but most of them really 
deal with the anti-competitive characteristics of the arrangements. For this 
reason the following chapter will, before moving on to the scrutiny of the 
framework, discuss potential benefits of pool formation in order to 
understand why they should be promoted at all. 
 
3.1 Clearing the patent thicket 
Patent pools are often suggested as a solution to the existing patent thicket. 
For society as a whole, a pressing situation is when existing patents have the 
power to prevent the emergence of another. Today we are facing a complex 
situation where ownership is shattered between numerous rights holders 
with overlapping patent rights. This means that actors wanting to 
commercialize an underlying product need to obtain licenses from all 
relevant rights holders. Shapiro refers to the situation as our patent system 
creating a patent thicket:  
A dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its 
way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.52 
The overlap can take different forms. One example is when several patents 
are essential for the commercialization of a given product as they might 
cover different aspects of the technology required.53 Another type of overlap 
is when patents are mutually blocking54 and access to another company’s 
patent is technologically necessary. A third possibility is when uncertainty 
about the nature of the patent as blocking or not, the access to the other 
firm’s patent, though not technologically necessary, required if the firm 
wants to proceed under conditions of legal certainty.55 The situation is more 
pressing than ever as the past two decades give evidence of an explosion of 
patent grants across many industries and a dramatic increase in the volume 
of patent litigation between rivals.56 
 
Overlapping rights lead to several problems. Heller and Eisenberg57 suggest 
through their theory “the tragedy of anti-commons”58 that where too many 
                                                
52 Shapiro, p. 120. 
53 Regibeau and Rockett, p. 13. 
54 Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 157. 
55 Regibeau and Rockett, p. 13. 
56 Lerner and Tirole (2008), p. 157. 
57 Heller and Eisenberg, p. 698. 
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actors are granted ownership of a scarce resource and have the possibility of 
excluding others from using it, the resource is likely to be underused. The 
reason is that actors must bargain in order to bundle the numerous rights, 
which can prove difficult as they represent different interests and therefore 
is likely to fail.59 The patent thicket consequently leads to a hold-up problem 
in terms of innovation, making it difficult for inventors to move technology 
forward.60 Furthermore, the process of bargaining licenses from multiple 
licensors means transaction costs as well as the end price of aggregated 
royalties paid is higher than it would if fewer licensees were needed. 
According to Shapiro's dystopian prediction, where cumulative innovation 
and multiple blocking patents are at hand, strong patent rights can have the 
opposite effect of stifling, not encouraging, innovation.61 Several are the 
commentators who believe patent pooling significantly contribute to the 
cutting through of the patent thicket, although involving some transaction 
costs.62 Some commentators however argue that the seriousness of the 
patent thicket should not be overrated. For example, Regibeau and Rocket 
question the true extent of the problem as the prevalence of thickets is very 
even across sectors and the lack of empirical work makes it impossible to 
determine the size of inefficiencies associated with the patent thickets.63 
 
Nevertheless, the patent thicket is considered to be one of the most crucial 
IP issues of today and the discussion on how to effectively clear it has taken 
on speed.64 One suggestion for clearing the thicket is reform of the current 
patent legislation, or at least the application of it, so that patentability 
criteria are raised, making it harder to be granted a patent right.65 As this 
would be a overwhelming and time consuming project, patent pools, and a 
more informed competition law attitude towards them, is an especially 
attractive alternative.66 
 
3.2 Other features promoting innovation  
Apart from being a solution to problems derived from the patent thicket, 
there are other features of patent pools supposedly working in favor of 
innovation and by this serving as a motive for the promotion of them. 
 
The reduction of litigation costs is one of these features. As familiar, 
lawsuits cost time and money,  that absent the dispute could be spent on a 
company’s actual business. Patent litigation trials are common and tend to 
                                                                                                                        
58 The more known economic theory ”tragedy of the commons” expressed by G. Hardin in 
1968 which suggests that where multiple owners all have the right to use a resource and no 
one the right to exclude others from using it the resource tend to be overused. 
59 Heller and Eisenberg, p. 701. 
60 Lerner and Tirole (2008), p.157. 
61 Shapiro, p. 120. 
62 See for example Merges (1999), p.17 or Shapiro, p. 119. 
63 Regibeau and Rockett, p. 17. 
64 Regibeau and Rockett, p. 16. 
65 Regibeau and Rockett, p. 16. 
66 Regibeau and Rockett, p. 16. 
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be exceptionally time-consuming, expensive and also a risky project for the 
parties. This has to do with the particular difficulties that judges and juries 
face when handling complex technical matters. In addition, both parties are 
at risk of a judge invalidating their patents.67 If choosing to settle through a 
patent pool, this means the guesswork of the judges related to the scope of 
the patentees IPRs can be avoided.68 Also, it enables the parties to focus on 
their business and further innovation instead of battling each other to the 
ground. The pooling option is especially attractive for smaller companies 
lacking the economic strength for prolonged litigation. This way, they may 
have a better chance of surviving should an infringement issue emerge.69 It 
should however be remembered that pools as means for settlement will only 
cease the proceedings between the members of the pool. Litigation is still 
likely to continue with rights holders outside the pool and the fact that the 
pool members now have joined forces, and share the costs, will build up to a 
big advantage towards independent players outside the pool.70 
 
Another disincentive for innovation is the extensive risk associated with it. 
Engaging in lengthy R & D projects can be the thing that makes or break the 
company. Pools may in this regard provide incentive to innovate by creating 
a mechanism for participants to distribute the risks of technology ventures. 
The sharing of both costs and benefits increases the likelihood for all 
participants to recoup the investments made during the development, 
making companies more keen on engaging in such activities. As Carlson 
reasons this should however be considered a secondary motive to pool 
formation, bearing in mind that patent pools are more common in the 
electronics market and rarer in the biotechnology, where the risks of failure 
as well as potential gains are high.71 
 
The patent pool can also promote innovation by countering spillover effects. 
An aspect of R & D projects is that the inventing company always has to 
expect certain amount of knowledge spilling out of it to the public, which 
could potentially benefit competitors. This would in turn decrease the 
incentive to engage in innovative activities. With pools, all members are 
both producers and receivers of information making the possible spillover 
effects less severe and innovators not as hesitant towards projects aimed at 
furthering innovation.72 
 
3.3 General view on patent pools 
The general view on patent pools seems to be one where consensus rules 
that patent pools have a lot of beneficial effects in their potential of 
furthering innovation. As Merges puts it: 
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When they are not being used as a cover for a cartel, they add significantly to the 
efficient operation of the patent system, as many industries have discovered over 
time.73 
For this reason, Merges believes that the optimal policy towards patent 
pooling, is not one with a total laissez faire attitude but neither should it 
discourage all pools.74 Accordingly, it would make sense for the 
government to contribute to the formation of pools and other exchange 
mechanisms, as this would give the government the possibility of preventing 
the more obvious misuses of the arrangement. At the very least Merges 
stresses, the policy should be neutral when an industry proposes the 
formation of a patent pool.75 Shapiro argues that antitrust law and 
enforcement should be more sensitive to the problems posed by the patent 
thicket, as it otherwise will slow down commercialization and ultimately 
retards innovation – the opposite of the intent of both the patent laws and 
the antitrust law.76 Regibeau and Rocket, being more skeptical to the 
thicket, believe it is too early to systematically weaken the traditional 
“safeguards” that competition law imposes on patent pool agreements. In 
their opinion, leniency should require a demonstration of actual thickets that 
would be cleared by the agreement and even possibly some evidence of the 
benefits involved in clearing them.77 
 
  
                                                
73 Merges (1999), p. 17. 
74 Merges (1999), p. 43. 
75 Merges (1999), p. 43. 
76 Shapiro, p. 122. 
77 Regibeau and Rockett, p.17. 
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4 The pooling agreement 
4.1 General about the framework 
Ensuring effective competition is a fundamental principle and key factor in 
establishing an internal market, hence one of the Unions primary 
commitments.78 The principal tool for combating anti-competitive behavior 
can be found in TFEU where Articles 101 and 102 expressively prohibit 
certain conduct that would affect competition in a negative way. The 
Commission is granted authority to investigate and, for the purpose of 
bringing an infringement to an end, impose any behavioral or structural 
remedies proportionate and necessary on involved undertakings.79 Article 
101 is the main provision for patent pools since they essentially consist of 
agreements between undertakings. However, it is thought that where a pool 
supports an industry standard, the members of the pool may be treated as 
jointly dominant, making Article 102 applicable.80 Agreements fulfilling the 
prerequisites in Article 101 must, in order to be found acceptable, reach the 
safe harbor of a block exemption regulation or individual exemption under 
Article 101(3). 
 
The licensing agreement is, from a competition law perspective, somewhat 
of an odd bird. The categorization of it as a vertical or horizontal 
collaboration is not self-evident, making the choice of applicable law rather 
complex. If a rights holder, in addition to his own production and sales, 
grants an independent middleman the right to use or sell the product or 
service, the agreement is of vertical nature and the 2010 Regulation on 
Vertical agreements is applicable.81 In contrast, if the rights holder, apart 
from his own production, transfers the right to produce to another 
undertaking, then the agreement should be seen as horizontal, making the 
TTBER applicable.82  
 
When dealing with licensing agreements for intellectual property they are 
seen as the latter and, for reasons relating to their specific nature, relieved 
through the block exemption TTBER from the application of Article 101 on 
the grounds that they promote innovation and development and 
consequently are pro-competitive. However the TTBER expressively 
exclude agreements for the pooling of technologies with the purpose of 
licensing the created package of IPRs to third parties i.e. patent pools.83 The 
reason for this is that pooling arrangements give rise to a number of 
particular issues regarding the selection of the included technologies and the 
                                                
78 TEU, Article 3.3. 
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82 Lidgard (2011), p. 184. 
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operation of the pool, which do not arise in the context of other types of 
licensing.84  
 
Given that neither the TTBER nor any other block exemption is applicable 
to patent pools, agreements establishing pools must either be found as being 
outside the scope of Article 101 or, if failing in this aspect, meet the criteria 
of an individual exemption in Article 101(3). The Commission has issued 
guidelines to provide guidance on the application of Article 101 as well as 
the TTBER. The Guidelines shall be applied flexibly and reasonably, not 
mechanically, and each case assessed on its own facts.85 The Guidelines 
confirm that the TTBER does not cover patent pools as these agreements do 
not concern licensing of  the production of contract products, i.e. products 
incorporating and produced with the licensed technology.86 
 
As the current TTBER with accompanied Guidelines will expire on 30 April 
2014, the Commission has, as part of its revision of the current framework, 
commissioned a study and consulted stakeholders on the application of the 
current regime. A majority of the stakeholders considered the present 
system as largely satisfactory. The comments that were given focused on the 
scope of the TTBER, market thresholds and patent pools as well as hardcore 
restrictions, grant-back provisions and cross-licensing.87 The Commission 
presented their proposal for revised TTBER and Guidelines on the 20th 
February 2013 with the aim “to strengthen incentives for research and 
innovation, to facilitate the diffusion of intellectual property and to stimulate 
competition”.88 The most substantial changes proposed in the draft have 
been made in the sections on settlement agreements and technology pools.89  
 
The section in the Guidelines covering patent pools, paragraphs 210 – 235, 
can be divided as they distinguish between, and deal separately with, two 
different features of patent pools. First, there are the provisions regulating 
the agreement between rights holders to pool their patents and the 
conditions for their mutual collaboration, further referred to as the pooling 
agreement. Secondly, there are provisions governing the licensing 
agreements, which the pool enters into with third parties henceforth called 
the licensing agreement. The following analysis will employ the same 
distinction and the provisions will be assessed one by one.  
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4.2 The patent pool concept 
The Guidelines start out by distinguishing a patent pool. According to the 
offered definition patent pools90 are: 
…arrangements whereby two or more parties assemble a package of technology 
which is licensed not only to contributors to the pool but also to third parties.91  
The definition is evidently narrower than the general one since it excludes 
arrangements where the pooled technologies stay within the pool. Such 
agreements, henceforth referred to as cross-licensing pools, resemble pure 
cross-licensing agreements and are not unusual in industries with shattered 
IPR ownership or where many IPRs of dubious quality exist. The main 
object of these pooling agreements is cost and risk reduction rather than 
joint sales.92 The provisions concerning patent pools are not applicable to 
this type of agreements. Instead the questionable solution has been made 
where if the agreement is bilateral the TTBER applies (since this is a 
condition) and if multilateral they are treated according the same principles 
as the TTBER by analogy, thus likely to qualify for an individual exemption 
under Article 101(3).93 An effect of the distinction between patent pools, as 
oppose to cross-licensing pools, avoid this ill-suited solution. 
 
The reason for distinguishing patent pools from cross-licensing pools is not 
explicitly stated and the same distinction cannot be found in the US IP 
Guidelines that bundle cross-licensing and pooling arrangements together.94  
 
A problem, with making the distinction, follows from the fact that patent 
pools rarely just involve the pooling and licensing of patents to third parties. 
The pools tend to also involve cross-licensing between contributing pool 
members so that each of them can exploit all the patents included in the 
pool. Ullrich argues that this means that pooling agreement between 
members must be legally separated from the cross-licensing agreement 
between them although both aspects of the agreements are most likely 
entered into at the same time.95 The pooling agreement relates to the 
technology market and the cross-licensing agreement relates to the product 
market and although both are economically highly interdependent, they are 
legally separated. Moreover, as the cross-licensing agreement is covered by 
the TTBER, or analogy of the same, this means that the members must be 
classified as competitors or non-competitors. The presumption is that 
holders of complementary patents are not competitors on the technology 
market.96 This can be criticized because in a situation where parties holds 
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mutually blocking patents common sense commands they are in fact 
competitors and irrespective of that parties would in any case be competitors 
on the product market. In addition, Ullrich argues that the dividing of the 
two aspects of the agreement destroys the reciprocity link typical for a 
pooling arrangement, meaning that the stipulations available internally will 
be limited.97 Ullrich concludes his thoughts by asking whether, in situations 
where a cross-licensing agreement is not block-exempted but subject to the 
indispensability test in Article 101(3), the benefits of the pool could not 
justify some more restrictive cross-licensing agreements when considering 
the overall arrangement.98 
 
4.3 The nature of pooled patents 
Continuing to most debated question by far, when speaking about patent 
pools, the Guidelines indicate that a pool’s competitive risks as well as 
efficiency enhancing potential depends, to a large extent, on the relationship 
between the pooled technologies and their relationship to technologies 
outside the pool. The following subchapter will explain these different types 
of nature as well as the difficulties related to distinguishing them. 
 
4.3.1 Substitutes 
According to the Commission pooling substitute technologies restrict inter-
technology competition, i.e. competition between the technologies in 
question, and is therefore likely to entail a higher royalty for the licensees. 
Further, reduced transactions cost cannot be expected since licensees, in the 
absence of the pool, would not have demanded both, alternative, 
technologies. The arrangement is seen as collective bundling and, if the pool 
substantially is composed of substitute technologies, price fixing between 
competitors. For these reasons, inclusion of substitute technologies 
constitutes a violation of Article 101 and is unlikely to reach the safe harbor 
of Article 101(3)  if the pool comprises to a significant extent of substitutes.  
To this end it does not matter that the firms have the possibility of 
independent licensing since the existence of the pool, which allows them to 
exercise market power, would face the risk of being undermined if they 
carried out such licensing. 
 
The provision is a clear statement that companies should never engage in 
pooling of substitute patents. It also sends a message to competition 
authorities to consider the safe harbor almost unreachable in the assessment 
of such a situation. The US seem to be of the same opinion about the anti-
competitive effects of pooling substitutes.  The DOJ stated in their Business 
Review Letter for the proposed MPEG-LA pool that aggregation of 
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competitive technologies and setting a single price for them is not allowed.99 
The participants of the PPP pool learned this the hard way. Their 
collaboration pooled existing and certain future patents for laser eye 
surgery, fixed prices and eliminated the competition between them, the only 
two companies with FDA approval to market the technology. The FTC 
issued a complaint in 1998 and ordered the dissolvation of the pool due to 
its anti-competitive effects.100 
 
The rationale for the view on substitute patents is explained in the actual 
provision. Substitute patents are believed to entail a higher royalty as well as 
having no positive effects on transaction costs. Turning to commentators 
they also offer support to this anti-substitute approach. Regibeau and 
Rockett conclude that pools containing mostly substitutes would be socially 
undesirable.101 Lerner and Tirole state that: 
…in the case of perfect substitutes/…/a pool is but a merger into a monopolistic 
arrangement and allows patent holders to suppress competition. Thus, pools of 
perfect substitutes should be banned.102 
However The American Chamber of Commerce103 has recently, in its 
consultation response to the current regime, reacted particularly against the 
strong presumption that inclusion of substitute technologies should infringe 
on Article 101. As far as their arguments go, such inclusion may be neutral 
or even pro-competitive depending on the facts and specific circumstances 
at hand. One of the arguments mentioned is that since the distinction 
between substitutes and complements is not clear-cut a strong presumption 
increases legal uncertainty and makes it more difficult to reach agreement 
on the composition of the pool, potentially leading to the exclusion of 
complementary patent. Further, when firms are contributing with multiple 
patents to a pool, allowing the inclusion of substitutes may make it easier 
for the parties to reach agreement of the overall composition of the pool, 
and as long as market power is insignificant or the technology relates to a 
relatively minor element of the final product should not give raise to 
competition concerns. Additionally, where substitute patents must be used 
in conjunction with other technologies, the inclusion of substitute patents in 
the pool can facilitate choice at the manufacturing level. The American 
Chamber of Commerce describes as an example a situation where consumer 
demand has not yet settled on a specific standard or technical solution, the 
inclusion of substitute technologies in the pool may allow manufacturers to 
introduce alternative versions of the same product/or produce products that 
work on multiple standards.  
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4.3.2 Complements 
When complementary technologies are pooled, it is the Commission’s belief 
that the arrangement reduces transaction costs for the licensee and leads to 
lower overall royalties because the license fee is set collectively and with 
regard to the whole package as oppose to independently. The question of 
essential or non-essential technologies104 is further relevant according to the 
Guidelines. When essential complementary technologies are pooled, the 
formation of the pool generally falls outside of Article 101 irrespective of 
the market position of the parties due to the benefits accounted for above 
(still, the conditions on which the license is granted on may be caught). 
When non-essential complementary technologies are pooled there is a risk 
of foreclosure of third party technologies since licensees have little incentive 
to look for technology outside the pool when an alternative technology is 
already included in the package offered. Further, there is the risk of 
licensees being forced to pay for technology that they may not need and in 
this respect the situation is seen as collective bundling. Conclusively, when 
a pool includes non-essential technologies, it is likely to be caught by 
Article 101 when having a signification position on any relevant market. 
 
Obviously the Guidelines strongly encourage all pooling of essential 
complementary patents. Also, pooling of non-essential complementary 
patents seems allowed as long as the pool does not enjoy a significant 
position on the market, as there is a risk of foreclosure of third parties and 
collective bundling. Worth noticing however is that pools of non-essential 
patents that might be hit by Article 101 always have the possibility of the 
safe harbor in Article 101(3). The condition for this is that there are pro-
competitive aspects balancing the anti-competitive nature of the patent. 
However, nowhere is it specified whether and in which respect these effects 
must be different from the general advantages of pooling i.e. simple saving 
transaction costs.105 
 
The US seems to be of the same opinion about the pooling of 
complementary technologies106 and although not using the same 
terminology, US competition authorities apply an external test to ensure that 
no patents in the pool have substitutes outside the pool. Before the US IP 
Guidelines were put into force in 1995, there were almost no provisions 
dealing with essentiality as a demand for inclusion.107 Now the essentiality 
demand is often determined by reference to the technical requirements set 
by a standard. 108 
 
Scholars support the potential welfare increase connected to the pooling of 
complementary patents. The foundation for the assumption that this would 
lead to overall lower royalties is found in the economy theory on double 
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marginalization and the “classic complements problem” developed by 
Cournot in 1838.109 Cournot concluded that the end price of a certain 
product, brass, would be lower if one single firm controlled trade of the two 
key components, copper and zinc, than if these were owned by two different 
producers with monopoly in their respective area. Also the combined profit 
for the producers would be lower in the latter scenario.  Lerner and Tirole 
offer a metaphor where a technology user is a shipping company trying to 
move goods by a ferry on a long a river controlled by different tax collectors 
in successive locations.110 The multiple taxation, or royalty stacking, could 
thus be avoided by pooling the complements. For the reason mentioned 
above, the conclusion seems to be that more leniency should apply to pools 
that including technologies that mainly consist complements.111  
 
It is hard to find any sympathies for pools of complements being anything 
other than well-fare enhancing. There is however some opinions about the 
sub-categorization into essential and non-essential patents. One concern is 
that the concept of essentiality is not defined in the Guidelines and some 
argue there are a number of alternative definitions. For instance, a patent can 
be deemed legally essential for a standard if the standard cannot be 
implemented without infringing that patent. 112 An example of this is the 
DVD-6 pool where essentiality was considered to be at hand where a 
technology “necessarily infringed” upon another, or when there were “no 
realistic alternative” to the technology when implementing the DVD 
standard specifications.113 Another possibility is commercial essentiality 
meaning that a standard cannot be implemented in a manner satisfactory to 
consumers without the patent, even though the standard might function 
properly without it. 114 An example of this was the provision defining an 
essential patent as one necessary (as a practical matter) for compliance with 
the DVD Standard Specifications.115 The fact that essentiality is not an 
absolute criterion but rather a sort of open-ended sliding scale leads to other 
effects. In contrast to the US, the EU determine essentiality by reference to 
any technology, product or process around which parties may wish to 
establish a pool.116 This means that the more the pooled technology is or 
might become subject to competition by alternative technologies, the more 
the essentiality criterion will tend to lose its selective effect. Using 
essentiality as a criterion for distinguishing between pro- and anti-
competitive pools has according to Ullrich simply been conceived as a 
dividing line between technologies within a pool and not as a means for 
distinguishing between the pools.117 
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There seems to be a discrepancy in the current Guidelines and the literature 
on whether to restrict patent pools to include only essential patents or not. 
Scholars does not support the cautious approach delivered by the 
Guidelines. Regibeau and Rockett conclude that the economic literature is 
not yet robust enough to consider changing the current approach, but believe 
that outside the safe harbor, under a rule of reason, the Commission should 
recognize that there might be needs to include non-essential patents in SSO 
oriented pools in order to achieve a degree of legal certainty.118 
 
4.3.3 The problematic distinction 
The main criticism towards the theories on substitute and complementary 
patents has not to do with their alleged competitive effects but rather the 
difficulties in making the distinction between them. The Commission itself 
confirms that the distinction is not clear-cut and presents some minor 
remedies for the situation when technologies are substitute in part and 
complements in part.119 However, there are other concerns. Carlson means 
that complex factors related to our patent system with overlapping rights 
over technologies makes the distinction of their relationship particularly 
devious. Firstly, he stresses that not all granted patents are valid. Patent 
authorities frequently overlook prior art in their handling of the matter that, 
were the case going to trial, would have precluded the claim from being 
issued.120 Secondly, Carlson lifts the doctrine of equivalents as a factor 
making the relationship even more unclear. The doctrine implies that the 
enforceable scope of a patent extends beyond the claim’s literal wording 
with the purpose of preventing infringements made through trivial 
modifications of the patented technology.121 Thirdly, he discusses 
difficulties relating to the fact that patent authorities grants the patents but 
courts decide their enforceable scope. As the scope and enforceability, as 
well as patent law and factual circumstances, is a complex issue, the 
litigation often overwhelms the courts. 122 These aspects seen together make 
the categorization between competing, complementary and blocking patent 
exceptionally uncertain.123  
 
Merges further discuss the fact that the patent landscape in an industry often 
cannot be explained in terms of strict complementarity.  
To take one example, assume there are two components that are essential for the 
proper functioning of a given product. Each of two firms holds a key patent on each 
of the components. Imagine it is possible for end-users to physically integrate the 
two components, but that it is much better if a manufacturer integrates the 
components into one marketable product (either it is cheaper to do so, or the 
resulting product works much better, or both.). In such a scenario, the patents are not 
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strictly complementary. Both patentees can realize some economic gain by selling 
the components directly to end-users. But both can also realize much higher returns 
if they cross-license the patents and manufacture integrated products for sale to end-
users.124 
Since the distinction is so hard to make, Merges argues that traditional “rule 
of reason” analysis ought to be applied during antitrust review.125 Lerner 
and Tirole126 also discuss the fact that the categorization is easier to deal 
with in the extreme cases of perfect substitutes or perfect complements, i.e. 
essential complements, but there are several intermediate cases making it 
much harder. For example, the level of the price of the patent can play a big 
part. If the prices for two imperfect patents are low enough, buyers are 
likely to acquire both of them making them in practice complements. 
However, if the prices are high, buyers will probably only acquire one of 
them, effectively making them substitutes. This creates a problem for 
competition policy, as substitutability and comparability cannot be decided 
absent consideration of the price.  
 
In addition, the fact that the nature of the patents change over time and that 
patent pools rarely consist of solely perfect complements or substitutes, but 
rather a menu of a wide variety of patents, makes the distinction even more 
difficult.127 This is further confirmed by Regibeau and Rockett who 
mentions that the Case Syngenta/Monsanto128 testifies of the particular 
difficulties where multiple products are based on the same stock of 
intellectual property, in the case a gene bank of sun flower seeds129 and in 
the merger case Axalto/Gemplus130 where the nature of the relationship 
between patents was in fact never defined.131  
 
Despite the fact that the distinction is devious, Regibeau and Rockett 
believe, that even if it is hard to determine where the exact line lies, there is 
a dividing line between substitutes and complements and the possible 
welfare effects are parallel to the degree of complementarity. For this 
reason, the authors think the EU are doing the right thing, being cautious 
and only granting a safe harbor for “perfect complements” i.e. essential 
patents.132 In practice this will mean that the safe harbor is restricted to 
pools supporting a SSO where the essentiality is more easily assessed.133 
They find support for their stance in Gilbert’s analysis of some 20 US patent 
pools decisions and his idea that the distinction between 
essential/complement and substitute IPRs might be of smaller practical 
relevance outside the standard-setting contexts where other aspects such as 
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price-fixing or market sharing agreements rather will determine the 
outcome.134  
 
4.4 The governance of the pool 
Related to the pooling agreement are also, in addition to the more general 
aspects discussed above, some guidelines addressing the organizational 
arrangement of the pool. Although the terms for the collaboration is 
ultimately a matter for the pool members to decide, the Commission offers 
its view on what they consider to be a desirable institutional framework for 
the pool. 
 
4.4.1 Open participation 
Talking about membership in the pool, the Guidelines express that when 
participation in the process of creating a pool or standard is open to all 
interested parties, representing different interests, this has pro-competitive 
effects. The argument is that the likelihood of the included technologies 
being selected on the basis of price and/or quality considerations, is bigger 
than when the pool is set up by a limited group of technology owners.135 
Similarly, when relevant bodies of the pool are composed of persons 
representing different interests, this is believed to result in licensing terms 
and other conditions for the licensing agreement being open and non-
discriminatory and reflect the value of the licensed technology than when 
the pool is controlled by licensor representatives.136 
 
Openness is further mentioned when stating that pools with a strong position 
on the market should be open and non-discriminatory.137 Whether openness 
in this respect refers to admission to membership or access to licenses is 
unclear. The new proposed Guidelines do however indicate that the latter 
interpretation is plausible and the provision will therefore be dealt with in 
the subsequent chapter.138  
 
Clearly, the Guidelines advocate pools that are open in all ways possible. 
Although not strictly prohibiting pools that fail to meet this condition, it is 
clear that the presumption for open pools is strong. In contrast, the US 
counterpart contains no presumption for pooling arrangements to be open 
for all to be assessed as pro-competitive. Although admitting that exclusion 
from a pool may harm competition, such anti-competitive effects are 
considered likely to emerge when (1) excluded firms cannot effectively 
compete in the relevant market for the product incorporating the licensed 
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technologies and (2) the pool participants collectively possess market power 
in the relevant market.139  
 
The position that exclusion from membership not necessarily is anti-
competitive is supported by Brenner who, based on the work of Lerner and 
Tirole, claims that exclusion possibly even have pro-competitive benefits.140 
Brenner proposes a pool formation mechanism that allegedly promotes 
welfare-enhancing pools and prevent their opposites. One of two features of 
the mechanism is the possibility of excluding applying members in the 
absence of the pool’s approval. The presumption is that when holders of 
complementary patents have the authority to exclude others it reduces the 
pool members’ incentive to unilaterally deviate from the pooling 
arrangement, avoiding the outsider’s dilemma. Deviation would risk 
destroying the pool with the result that the pro-competitive gains with it 
would be lost. However, as the same presumption applies to pools 
comprising substitute patents, Brenner proposes an additional feature, the 
possibility for members to offer individual licenses parallel to the pool.141 
The latter will be discussed in the following subchapter. 
 
Regibeau and Rockett also acknowledge that pools with selective 
membership can be pro-competitive. Still, some justification as to why 
should be necessary before allowing it.142 The authors believe that EU’s 
strong preference for open pools primarily is based on considerations of 
efficient technology choice, i.e. that technologies are selected on the basis of 
price and/or quality consideration, rather than openness in terms of 
admission to the pool. For this reason Regibeau and Rockett believe that the 
current EU position is not as far from Brenner’s conclusions as one might 
initially think.143 
 
4.4.2 Independent licensing 
The Guidelines further lift independent licensing as a pro-competitive factor 
relevant in the assessment of pools comprising non-essential technologies. 
In their decision of granting or denying an individual exception under 
Article 101(3) the Commission are obliged to take into account whether the 
licensors remain free to license their respective technologies 
independently.144 The justification for this provision is not presented, 
instead the legislator elaborate on the reasons for a company wanting such 
an individual license. 
 
It should be recalled that this aspect will only be of relevance when dealing 
with non-essential complementary patents. As mentioned earlier, the 
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Guidelines explicitly state that the possibility of independent licensing has 
no effect on the prohibition against the pooling of substitute patents. Also, 
since the pooling of essential complementary patents is considered to be 
outside the scope of Article 101, this means that the question of independent 
licensing is irrelevant for this type of pool. 
 
Even though an explicit presumption cannot be found in the US IP 
Guidelines, US competition authorities have shown to agree on the position 
in their business review letters concerning recent patent pools. The MPEG-
LA pool is one example where the feature that licensees were not able to 
obtain fewer than all the pooled patents as one package, was 
counterbalanced by the fact that all portfolio patents were available 
individually from their owners or assignees.145 
 
The rationale for independent licensing is not declared but it should be safe 
to say that it is closely associated to the presumption for openness. If 
licensors remain free to license independently, third parties are not 
foreclosed from the technology and licensees are not obliged to license from 
the pool. The doctrinal comments are agreeing on that the possibility of 
independent licensing indicates that the pool has pro-competitive effects. 
Lerner and Tirole point to their results from a study carried out 2004 in that 
independent licensing perfectly screen out “good” as well as “bad” pools.146 
Where a pool comprises perfect substitutes, independent licensing recreates 
cutthroat competition between them with the result that no incentive is left 
for creating such a pool. On the other hand, where the pool contains perfect 
complements, independent licensing has no effect. This has to do with the 
fact that licensees will only be interested in buying all the licenses 
individually instead of the package offered by the pool if the end price is 
lower which, due to royalty stacking, is unlikely to happen.147 For the 
intermediate cases, where there are imperfections in the substitutability or 
complementarity, the independent licensing mechanism will relieve the 
competition authorities from making the complex distinction between 
substitutes and complements as the mechanism works automatically.148 
 
A more careful view is offered by Brenner. He shows that the mechanism is 
not as an efficient antitrust tool as Lerner and Tirole’s analysis might 
suggest. Brenner however stresses that the mechanism in conjunction with 
exclusive pool membership, as mentioned above, avoids stability problems 
of welfare enhancing pools while creates instability of welfare decreasing 
pools.149 Ullrich is also skeptical towards putting too much weight on 
independent licensing as a mitigating factor as this hardly will ever present a 
realistic alternative to the pool. This would require that the licensee has 
sufficient technological potential and economic power for the individual 
negotiations to be effective. However it is this precise reason, the avoidance 
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of transaction costs, that made the pooling of patents attractive in the first 
place.150 
 
4.4.3 Degree of independent experts 
Yet another factor is the extent to which independent experts are involved in 
the creation and operation of the pool.151 Experts can be of value when 
assessing essentiality or validity where their involvement is believed to 
ensure that only valid essential technologies are included in the pool. The 
proposed Guidelines also add that independent experts may further 
competition between available technological solutions. The Commission 
shall take into account how experts are selected and the exact functions of 
their assignment. The experts must have the necessary technical expertise 
and be independent from the undertakings forming the pool. If not, their 
objectivity is lost and their existence cannot be considered in the assessment 
of the pool.152 A closely related governance feature is the dispute resolution 
mechanism chosen for the collaboration. As, with the case of independent 
experts, the more dispute resolution that is entrusted to bodies or persons 
independent of the pool and members, the more likely it is that the dispute 
resolution will operate in a neutral way.153 
 
US Competition authorities have on numerous occasions offered their 
support for the same position. Accordingly, in the MPEG-2 Business 
Review Letter an independent expert was described as an especially 
effective guarantee for reducing the likelihood of licensors acting 
concertedly to keep invalid or non-essential patents in the Portfolio or 
excluding other essential patents from admission to the Portfolio.154 The 
MPEG-2 also had a pre-agreed procedure for settling disputes.155 The two 
DVD-pools are other examples where standing experts were employed to 
determine essentiality and perform periodic evaluations of prospective new 
patents for the pool.156 In the former of the two DVD-pools, the independent 
expert mechanism was considered to be somewhat flawed as the expert was 
appointed directly by the licensors. This was problematic since licensors 
have an incentive to include any of their own competing patents and to 
foreclose others. However, the DOJ was satisfied with the licensors’ written 
assurance that the expert’s compensation and future retention would not be 
affected by his determination of essentiality. 
 
Looking to the literature, Layne-Farrar and Lerner declare that the vast 
majority of modern pools demand patents to be reviewed for essentiality by 
an independent patent expert. The opposite is true for SSOs that generally 
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take members on faith. The authors believe the difference is understandable 
as the inclusion of an extraneous patent in a pool affect the other members’ 
share of total licensing earnings. In contrast, the same situation for a 
standard does little, if any harm, as firms implementing the standard can 
simply choose to ignore it. Using an independent expert recognizes the 
difficulty of determining genuine essentiality and also acknowledges the 
controversial nature of such reviews.157 Merges discusses incentives for 
involving independent experts to the pool. One is to prevent strategic 
posturing since independent review puts limits to bargaining. Companies 
will find it difficult to argue that its technology is the key to the standard, 
and deserving a large part of the revenue, if the independent expert find 
otherwise.158 Additionally, independent experts, with their offered second 
opinion, is also a powerful corrective to a stubborn pool member inflexible 
about the importance of its contribution to the pool. It is no coincidence, for 
example, that the independent expert hired by one of the two DVD pools is 
required to be an expert in DVD technology.159 
 
4.4.4 Arrangements for exchange of sensitive 
information 
The potential exchange of sensitive information among competing parties is 
further expressed as a concern in need of neutralization. The Guidelines 
believe that, especially on oligopolistic markets, exchange of information 
about pricing and output data may facilitate collusion. For this reason the 
Commission will take into account to what extent safeguards towards such 
information exchange have been put in place. One suggested way of doing 
this is by using independent experts for the calculation and verifying of 
royalties. Although the operation requires access to such sensitive 
information it can by the use of independent experts be performed without 
risking the disclosing of it to the competing undertakings.160 The proposed 
Guidelines also recommend special care to be taken when parties 
simultaneously participate in efforts to form pools of competing standards 
where there is a risk of exchange of sensitive information between 
competing pools.161 
 
The question of exchanging of sensitive information, although not a patent 
pool case, was before the European courts through the case John Deere162. 
Here the CFI, and later ECJ, concluded that an agreement between some 
manufacturers of agricultural tractors, in possession of 87-88 % of the UK 
market, exchanging information about the sales of individual competitors as 
well as sales and imports of dealers, infringed Article 101 (at the time 
Article 85).  The courts considered the structure of the market, the type of 
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data supplied, the detailed nature of the information exchanged and the fact 
that the parties to the agreement regularly met in their assessment. In its 
decision the courts stated the agreement had the effect of restricting 
competition by increasing transparency on a highly concentrated market and 
by raising the barriers to entry of non-members to it. Also, the distribution 
of sales data of dealers facilitated the identification of the various 
competitors’ sales. The same evaluation is likely to be used should the 
patent pools exchange of sensitive information be before the court. 
 
As pooling intensify the collaboration between undertakings, the 
arrangement for a safeguard can be found in many modern pools. In the 
MPEG-LA pool, the pool was authorized to audit its licensees but explicitly 
prohibited from transmitting confidential information between the licensors 
and licensees.163 The same provision can be found in the DVD-3 pool where 
the ability to audit licensees was considered unlikely to entail access to 
sensitive information, such as cost data, as the audit was being made by 
independent accountants.164 
 
4.5 Discussion 
From the section above, one should now be able to answer the question of 
how the legal framework for the pooling agreement looks and what the 
conditions and presumptions for it to be compatible with EU antitrust 
legislation are. This subchapter will continue to discuss and question the 
rationale for the different parts of the policy. 
 
That the Guidelines do not, as one might initially think, create a unitary 
legal statute for patent pools is clear when studying the policy more closely. 
The different features of the pooling arrangement have been legally 
separated and great attention is required to what part of the arrangement is 
covered by which framework, in order not to lose oneself in the different 
provisions. If starting out by considering the reason for distinguishing patent 
pools from cross-licensing pools and cross-licensing between pool 
members, this is not offered by the Commission itself. A possible and quite 
natural assumption is that the legislator wants arrangements with great 
similarities to pure cross-licensing agreement to be covered by the same 
rules, in this case the TTBER. Not doing this means the application of the 
block exemption would rely on whether the licensors called their 
arrangement a pool or cross-license. However, in a pooling context, the 
unique relationship between the pooling agreement and the cross-licensing 
agreement makes a legal separation of the two particularly devious, possibly 
resulting in undesirable effects. 
 
First of all, making the TTBER applicable presupposes that we’re dealing 
with bilateral agreements, often not the case in a pooling context. 
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Consequently, the legal certainty for bilateral cross-licensing agreements is 
strong, whereas the situation for multilateral agreements, neither covered by 
the TTBER nor the Guidelines, are the opposite. The statement that the 
multilateral agreements should be assessed by analogy is a pointer to how 
the individual assessment should be made, but this is still far from enjoying 
the benefit of the block-exemption.  
 
Furthermore the application of the TTBER also brings about a 
categorization of the pooling members as competitors or non-competitors.  
The assessment is based on whether the technologies subject for cross-
licensing, are substitute or complements. In a situation where the members 
hold mutually blocking complementary patents they are in the TTBERs 
opinion seen as non-competitors. As Ullrich suggests, common sense 
demands that two players with the possibility of preventing action on the 
market by the other are in fact competitors on that market. In addition, if 
considering that both of them are probably active on the downstream 
product market they are in any case competitors on this level. Thus, the 
presumption seems unfitting for a pooling context and may lead to a false 
security in which agreements are to be seen as anti-competitive and which 
are no not.  
 
The question of how far the legal separation will extend is also of interest. 
Should the reciprocity link be cut completely it means the two types of 
agreement must be assessed in total isolation of each other.  It seems 
unreasonable, in a situation where the cross-licensing agreement between 
pool members is assessed under the indispensability test in Article 101(3) 
that the pro-competitive aspects of the pooling agreement not also should be 
taken into account. Especially as the pro-competitive features probably are 
found in the actual pooling of patents more often than in the cross-licensing 
between pool members. On the other hand, if recourse could be taken to the 
pooling agreement when assessing the cross-licensing agreement this means 
that the legal separation is not complete,  an even worse solution from a 
legal certainty perspective. All of the above seems to testify that the 
differences between cross-licensing in a pooling context and pure cross-
licensing are bigger than the similarities between the two. For this reason it 
is fair to question whether a legal separation is justified or if not a separate 
legal statute for the two would be preferable. 
 
Continuing now to the competitive assessment based on the nature of pooled 
patents. The strong position against the pooling of substitutes and the 
equally strong promotion of complementary pooling seems to exist on all 
levels. The aversion towards substitutes is not surprising when considering 
our long legacy of reaction against collaboration between horizontal 
competitors. A change of thinking could not be expected in the nearest 
future, even if pools of substitute patents would show pro-competitive 
effects. This could possibly constitute a problem, as a change of thinking 
might be required in order to achieve the desired boost for innovation in the 
EU. The American Chamber of Commerce advocates a moving away from 
the presumption against the pooling of substitutes.  Perhaps this is not 
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surprising as the AmCham in general wish to move away from rules and 
presumptions that are not hardcore restraints as well as adopting safe 
harbors wherever possible. The argument is that this would help limit 
uncertainty that stifles incentives to innovate as well as the transfer of 
technology. However, even if the assumption that pools of substitute patents 
are “bad” and pools of complementary patents are “good” in terms of 
competition should be universally agreed, the practical problem remains 
with the distinction not being clear-cut and extremely complex to perform. 
Similar problems come with the using of the concept of essentiality as a 
decisive criterion for whether the pools are pro- or anticompetitive by 
nature. Just as Ullrich predicts, the fact that essentiality is not an absolute 
criterion may lead to the criterion losing its selective effect.  
 
The question arises whether a preservation of the presumptions above are 
worth all the time and effort. It would possibly be easier and perhaps more 
appropriate to do as the AmCham suggests, to cut all presumptions and  
focus on creating efficient hardcore restrictions and safeguards. Should this 
approach conquer ground, one must then question the point of having 
guidelines at all. Guidelines with no presumptions would have the sole 
purpose to state that a rule of reason would apply, the assessment would 
then be left at competition authorities and courts total discretion. This is the 
reason why Regibeau and Rockett suggest keeping the presumption that the 
pro-competitiveness of pools increases with the degree of complementarity 
and that the safe harbor is saved for essential complements only. An 
alternative, and much bolder, move would be to consider introducing a 
block exemption regulation for patent pools. 
 
Conclusively, reviewing the proposed governance features, the Guidelines 
clearly work under the agenda to make the pooling agreement as similar to 
the situation before the pool was formed as possible. Openness is strongly 
preferred in the EU but whether the openness refers to admission to 
membership, to the choice of technology included in the pool or for all 
potential licensees to be granted a license, is somewhat unclear. The 
indistinctness of the term could be interpreted as the legislators wish for 
pools to be open in any way possible. This however is not very likely since 
the pool in some aspects must be exclusive in order for the incentive to 
create a pool not to disappear completely. Moreover, the feature of 
independent licensing seems to be encouraged by most scholars. The 
rationale for the provision should be the same as the motives for openness. 
The main criticism towards this provision is that it will hardly ever present a 
realistic alternative to the pool, and the importance of it can therefore be 
questioned. Further the degree of independent experts and arrangement for 
sensitive information wishes to secure that the competitors will not come 
too close as this would risk sensitive information being disclosed. Although 
the true extent and effect of these provisions are hard to determine absent 
case-law or more empirical evaluation, they are easier to accept straight off 
as they do not, apart from increasing costs, in any appreciable extent restrain 
the creation or operation of the pool.  
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5 The licensing agreement 
5.1 General about the framework 
Licensing agreements between the pool and third parties shall, according to 
the current framework, be treated like other licensing agreements. In other 
words, they are covered by the TTBER and block exempted when the 
conditions set out in the regulation are fulfilled.165  
 
The fact that the TTBER remains fully applicable on licensing out from the 
pool have been suggested by Ullrich as a sign on the pool retaining broad 
powers of control over its licensees. Apart from price fixing and some 
reservations based on whether the undertakings are competitors or not, 
various kinds of territorial limitations and restrictions for field-of-use and 
output are permitted. In addition, the pool is free to put up specifications 
related to technical and quality aspects, supply or service tying, labeling 
requirements as well as minimum royalties or quantities.166 It should 
however be remembered that the fact that a licensing agreement between the 
pool and third party may come within the block exemption doesn’t 
necessary mean it will. According to Korah, such licensing agreements tend 
to exceed the market share ceiling with the result of the TTBER not being 
applicable.167 
 
As the TTBER is applicable to some aspects of the licensing agreement the, 
for a pooling context ill-suited, distinction between bilateral and multilateral 
agreements yet again becomes a decisive factor. In this scenario, the matter 
has been solved by presuming that the licensing agreement between the pool 
and the licensee is of bilateral nature. Ullrich argues that making this 
presumption means that the most salient feature of the pool is held to be 
immaterial, namely the circumstance that typically a pool’s licensing 
activities are not limited to parallel licensing from the pool to several third 
party licensees but also include parallel licensing from several licensors, 
who may be more or less direct competitors to the pool.168 The fact that the 
agreement, in spite of this, is presumed to be bilateral, shows the limits for 
when a third party licensing agreement can be assessed as an individual and 
independent transaction and also reveals the wide scope of private market 
regulation which pools potentially establish.169 Whether it was the points 
made by Ullrich or other motives behind the Commissions changing the 
presumption in the proposed Guidelines is uncertain. Licensing out from the 
pool is in the proposal generally considered as a multiparty agreement based 
on the idea that the contributors commonly determine the conditions for 
such licensing. The result is that licensing agreements are not at all covered 
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by the TTBER but dealt with under section IV 4.2. of the Guidelines.170 
This means that for the licensing agreement, as for the pooling agreement, 
the competition assessment is a question of it being hit by Article 101(1), 
and if so whether an individual exemption can come into question. A 
reference to Article 4 in the TTBER has however been incorporated in the 
Guidelines stating that the technology transfer agreement may not contain 
any of the hardcore restrictions listed in Article 4.171 
 
The individual restraints brought up for discussion in the Guidelines are 
terms commonly found in licensing agreements from pools. The restrictions 
shall be assessed by the Commission in the light of the overall assessment of 
the pool and after some main principles. The articulated principles are 
founded on the assumption that the stronger the market position of the pool, 
the greater the risk of anti-competitive effects are. For this reason pools with 
a strong position should be open and non-discriminatory. Also pools should 
not unduly foreclose third party technologies or limit creation of alternative 
pools.172 In the proposed Guidelines some smaller alterations in the wording 
of the principles has also been made.  
 
5.2  Royalty fees and other licensing 
terms 
According to the Guidelines, undertakings are normally free to negotiate 
and fix royalties for the technology package and each technology’s share of 
the royalties. Such an agreement is inherent in the creation of the pool and 
cannot in itself be considered restrictive of competition. On the contrary it 
may in certain circumstances lead to more efficient outcomes.  What is not 
allowed is however restrictions of licensees’ freedom to determine the price 
of products produced under the license.173 Pools with a dominant position 
on the market face additional restrictions. Although free to negotiate, 
dominant pools must offer royalties and other licensing terms on a fair and 
non-discriminatory basis and the licenses granted should be non-exclusive. 
These demands are seen as necessary in order to ensure that the pool is open 
and does not lead to foreclosure and other anti-competitive effects on the 
downstream markets. Still, different royalties for different uses is allowed. 
For example, different royalties for different product markets are seen as not 
restrictive of competition whereas different royalties for within the same 
product market are. The Commission will take into account whether the 
contributing licensors to the pool are subjected to royalty obligations as 
there is a particular risk that these actors would be favored.174 In the new 
proposed Guidelines the wording has changed and instead of declaring that 
pools with a strong position on the market must be “open and non-
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discriminatory” a presumption has been added declaring that the stronger 
the market position of the pool, the more likely an agreement between 
members not to license to all or to license on discriminatory terms will 
infringe Article 101.175 
 
The US IP Guidelines do not explicitly state an obligation for pools to apply 
fair and non-discriminatory terms. However most modern pools have shown 
to meet these requirements. As an example, the MPEG-LA undertook to 
grant a worldwide, non-exclusive sublicense under the Portfolio to make, 
use and sell MPEG-2 products to each and every potential licensee and not 
to discriminate among potential licensees. 
 
The desire for pools applying fair and non-discriminatory conditions is 
really a desire for licensees to be treated equally. Although most would 
agree that equal treatment is a noble ambition, the effect of incorporating it 
as a provision in the Guidelines might not produce all the pro-competitive 
aspects attributed to it. Ullrich believes that equal treatment of pool 
members and third parties regarding licensing terms really will only be an 
alternative if the pool has an interest of its own in attracting the licensees on 
equal and/or favorable conditions. A typical example offered are pools 
aspiring to establish a technology standard. In these cases, royalties 
foregone by favorable conditions to licensees, will be compensated in the 
longer run by increased market opportunities for the pool members. In other 
cases, the pool members have joined together with a view to obtain an 
economic advantage on the market and are likely to insist on keeping some 
of this competitive advantage, at least towards their competitors.176 For this 
reason, Ullrich’s conclusion is to use equal treatment requirements as a 
remedy to control the overall distortion of competition resulting from the 
pools members’ long-term collective action rather than focusing on specific 
terms. In his opinion this should be made independently of the existence of 
market power. He also suggests that the proper issue may not be equal 
treatment of licensees, but admission of new members to the pool on equal 
terms.177 
 
5.3 Grant-back clauses 
A grant-back clause obligates members of the pool to offer future patent 
improvements to the pool at low or no fee. This is a way for the pool to feed 
on and benefit from improvements to the pooled technology. According to 
the Guidelines it is legitimate for the parties to ensure that the exploitation 
of the pooled technology cannot be up-held by licensees that hold or obtain 
essential patents. However, the grant-back clauses must be limited to 
developments that are essential or important to the use of the pooled 
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technology.178 Also, exclusive grant-backs, where the right of exploitation is 
transferred exclusively to the pool with the result that not even the improver 
himself can use the patent, must be avoided if wanting to reach the safe 
harbor of an individual exemption. With the recently proposed TTBER the 
same now applies to exclusive grant-backs outside the pooling context. 
Before, a distinction was made between so called severable improvements, 
within the safe harbor, and non-severable improvements, which were not.  
By this change, the Commission hopes to secure sufficient incentives for 
follow-on inventions. 179 
 
Grant-back clauses are common in modern pools. For example, the Business 
Review Letter for the DVD-3 pool180 described the grant-back provision as 
one likely to bring other essential patents into the Portfolio, thereby limiting 
holdouts’ ability to extract supra-competitive toll from Portfolio licensees 
and further lowering licensees’ cost in assembling the essential patent rights. 
Thus the parties see the grant-back clause as a way to limit future 
opportunism.181 The MPEG-LA pool182 contained a comparable provision, 
stating that essential patents should be made available at a “fair and 
reasonable royalty”. The basis for determining this fair and reasonable 
royalty was the licensors per patent share of royalties. Alternatively, a 
licensee in control of an essential patent had the choice of becoming an 
MPEG-2 licensor and add its patent to the Portfolio. The DOJ approved the 
clause as its scope was limited to essential patents and did not extend to 
mere implementations of the standard or even to improvements on the 
essential patents. According to DOJ this meant that any firm wishing to take 
advantage of the cost savings afforded by the Portfolio license could hold its 
own essential patents back from other would-be manufacturers of MPEG-2 
products. Since the grant-back was extended only to MPEG-2 Essential 
Patents, it was further unlikely to entail any disincentive among licensees to 
innovate as there is not any significant innovation left to be done that the 
grant-back could discourage. Historically in the US, grant-back obligations 
was put on the DOJ’s watch-list over nine specified licensing practices 
viewed as anticompetitive restraints of trade in the 1970’s, also  known as 
the “nine no-no’s”. Today, similarly to the EU, their pro-competitive effects 
are recognized, but still there is some skepticism evolving around grant-
backs and their possibility of being expanded to encompass non-essential 
patents.183 According to the DOJ grant-backs are today not rejected as 
anticompetitive if properly structured. 
The motive behind grant-back clauses is the fear of patent holdup i.e. that a 
new improvement will be developed by one of the pool members or 
licensees and then used to hold up the pool for high royalties.184 When the 
pool supports a standard a calculating licensee of the pool, in possession of 
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a patent application covering some essential aspect of the technology 
pending when the standard was announced, might acquire such a patent and 
use it to extract concessions from the pool members.185 Since patent hold-
ups are negative from society’s point of view, grant-backs work in society’s 
as well as the pools favor. On the other hand, grant-backs can also inhibit 
innovation if future inventions are rolled into an existing pool without 
adjusting the package royalty rate or the share of rents.186 Further, grant-
backs for current and future technology at minimal cost may reduce the 
incentives of its members to engage in R&D because members of the pool 
have to share their successful result and the pool members can free ride on 
the accomplishments.187 The risk of restricted competition on the innovation 
market is believed to be most imminent when the pool includes a majority 
of the actors on the relevant innovation market and when essentiality is 
likely to be interpreted in a rather broad sense.188 Although a grant-back 
clause may be a device for restricting competition in the innovation market, 
their pro-competitive benefits makes a per se prohibition unfitting from a 
social planners point of view.189  
As mentioned above, grant-back obligations must be limited to important, as 
distinguished from non-essential, improvements, and the obligations should 
be non-exclusive.190 The essentiality assessment as earlier discussed is a 
pain staking process as the determination, typically made by an outside 
lawyer, involves detailed claims of each patent and the vagueness of the 
term essentiality makes the decision complex both from a private and social 
perspective.191 Looking to the non-exclusivity there are some author’s 
questioning its effect. Ullrich believes that irrespective of the grant-back 
being exclusive or not, agreeing to grant-backs is advantageous not only for 
the pool members but also for the licensees agreeing to the grant-back, as 
the improvements become part of the pool’s centralized, cost-saving 
licensing procedure.192 Thus, the attractiveness of the pool is increased with 
the result that an improver would choose to license its improvement to the 
pool even though no exclusive grant-back was at hand. 
 
5.4 Non-compete clauses 
According to the Guidelines, licensors as well as licensees must be free to 
develop competing products and standards as well as grant and obtain 
licenses from outside the pool. Similar provisions can be found in the 
TTBER. For competing undertakings, the hardcore restrictions in Article 4 
stipulate that restrictions of the licensee’s ability to exploit its own 
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technology or the ability of any of the parties to the agreement to carry out 
R & D remove the benefit of the block exemption. The latter of the two can 
however be accepted if the restriction is indispensable to prevent the 
disclosure of the licensed know-how to third parties. The same applies to 
non-competing undertakings according to Article 5 with the difference that 
only the particular obligation is void, not the entire agreement. 
 
The US IP Guidelines also raise concerns for arrangements that deter or 
discourage participants from engaging in R & D.193 Once more serving as an 
example, the MPEG-LA pool imposes no obligation on licensees to only use 
pooled patents and explicitly leaves the licensee with freedom to  
independently develop competitive video products or video services which 
do not comply with the MPEG-2 standard.194  
 
The rationale for the provision, explicitly stated in the Guidelines, is the 
assumption that non-compete clauses risk the foreclosure of third party 
technologies and that the pool limits innovation and also preclude the 
creation of competing technological solutions. The risk of non-compete 
obligations preventing development of new and improved technologies and 
standards is particularly big when a pool supports an (de facto) industry 
standard.195 Non-compete obligations have in other contexts been 
considered to have pro-competitive benefits. For example, the ECJ has 
declared that a non-compete obligation in an agreement regarding the sale of 
an undertaking can lead to an increase in the number of undertakings on the 
market.196 Absent a non-compete clause, the vendor could easily win his 
customers back immediately after the transfer of the undertaking due to his 
particular detailed knowledge of it with the risk of the acquiring undertaking 
would be driven out of business. In the pooling context however the pro-
competitive aspects are harder to see why limiting the possibility of 
including them is a statement that the pool’s effect on the market should not 
be reinforced by the imposition of non-compete clauses on either parties or 
third parties.197 
 
5.5 Termination and non-challenge 
clauses 
The Commission also mentions a commonly uttered problem with patent 
pool, the risk that they shield invalid patents. The cost and risks associated 
with challenging a patent are always high but patent pools increase them 
even further. The reason for this is that a challenge will fail as long as one 
patent in the pool is valid, making the risk of the pool shielding invalid 
patents imminent. Also, the essentiality requirement for the building of the 
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pool means that a challenging licensee is faced with the risk of being unable 
to work the pool technology altogether if the challenge falls.198 Seen 
together, these aspects add up to disincentive for challenging any patent in 
the pool. This may in turn lead to the pool being able to set higher royalties 
to the detriment of licensees as well as prevent innovation in the field 
covered by the invalid patent.  
 
In order to mitigate the risk mentioned above, termination clauses, a right 
for a licensor to terminate a license in the case of the other party challenging 
the licensed technology, must be must be limited to the technologies owned 
by the licensor who is the addressee of the challenge and are not allowed to 
extend to the technologies owned by the other licensors in the pool.199 The 
reason for this has to do with the fact that a licensee may have made 
substantial investments in the use of the pool’s technology. A similar clause 
can be found in the recently proposed TTBER. 
 
However, how a clause preventing the licensee from challenging the validity 
of the patent, a non-challenge clause, will be assessed is not mentioned in 
the current Guidelines. In the proposed Guidelines this has been changed 
and they now declare that a non-challenge clause, inclusive terms for 
termination, in agreement between the pool and third party is within the 
scope of Article 101(1).200 Looking to the TTBER, such clauses are not 
block exempted but does not preclude the rest of the agreement to benefit 
from the safe harbor. 
 
5.6 Discussion 
The reader should by now have gained an understanding of the competition 
policy on the licensing agreement. Regarding the rationale and justification 
for the policy, the following can be said. 
 
With the current framework, a licensing agreement between the pool and 
third party is treated the same as other licensing agreements, hence covered 
by the TTBER. This means that even if patent pools are collaborations 
between potential competitors, licensing agreements coming out from the 
pool still enjoy the benefit of the block exemption. Just like the cross-
licensing agreements between pool members discussed in the former 
chapter, the reason for applying the TTBER can be expected to be the 
legislator’s wish to use the existing block exemption as the licensing 
agreement in a pooling context in most aspects reflects an “ordinary” 
licensing agreement from a single licensor to licensee. The problem with 
doing this, is that the ill-suited distinction between bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements yet again becomes a decisive factor. In this case, the solution 
has been to simply establish a presumption saying that the licensing 
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agreement is of bilateral nature. The motivation for this is nowhere to be 
found and as the commentators have suggested this must really be the limit 
for what can be considered as an individual agreement. For these reasons, it 
seems as if the presumption is forced for technical rather than logical 
reasons. The fact that the recently proposed Guidelines turns the 
presumption, and proclaim that these licensing agreements instead should be 
dealt with exclusively by the Guidelines, is therefore a welcomed solution.  
The effect of this proposed change is not biggest in the material provisions, 
as the new Guidelines are complemented with a reference to the hardcore 
restrictions in the TTBER. However, in terms of the procedural aspects, the 
adjustment means that the burden of proof is now shifted from the 
Commission to the pool to show that the licensing agreement is entitled to 
an individual exemption under Article 101(3). Although it might seem as a 
setback for the companies, losing the benefit of the block exemption and 
gaining the burden of proof, the fact that the legal solution is more 
appropriate as well as all provisions dealing with the licensing agreement 
can be found in one place, will hopefully compensate in terms of increased 
legal certainty. 
 
Continuing to the actual restrictions discussed in the Guidelines there seems 
to be a demand for pools with a dominant position on the market to apply 
royalty fees and other terms that are fair and reasonable. The term FRAND 
(fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) is often used. The provision is 
obviously founded on the overall principle that pools with stronger market 
position are more likely to increase the risk of anti-competitive effects. It is 
hard to see any negative consequences with demanding a pool to apply such 
terms. However the effect of the provision might be that only pools with an 
interest other than that of gaining an economic advantage, for example the 
creation of a standard, will emerge. The reason for this, is that only in 
situations where there’s a future possibility of making up for the possible 
losses made, incentives for such other pools would exist.  
 
Moving on to grant-back clauses, the provision dealing with this feature is 
the most extensive one in the Guidelines, as is the literature dealing with it. 
The reason for debate, is that grant-back clauses have both pro-competitive 
and anti-competitive effects. In the attempt of balancing these two 
opposites, the Guidelines state that the obligation of grant-back must be 
limited to encompass non-essential patents and that the obligation never can 
require the licensing back to the pool to be exclusive. As regards the 
essentiality-requirement, we again face the difficulties associated with it. 
The problem is that one can never be sure whether a patent determined 
essential actually is essential and whether it will be the same tomorrow. 
Moreover, the effect of the demand for non-exclusivity questioned by 
Ullrich seems fair. Most of the times the licensee will probably have a 
strong incentive to join the pool with his new non-essential patent instead of 
licensing it back to the pool, making the question of exclusive or non-
exclusive license immaterial. Keeping the prohibition against exclusive 
grant-backs could possibly act as an extra safeguard and would also 
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correspond with the view on grant-back clauses in general why no harm can 
be seen in keeping it.  
 
Further on, there seems to be an understanding that non-compete clauses in 
the pooling context do not lead to any pro-competitive benefits. Instead non-
compete clauses are seen as a direct foreclosure of third parties as well as 
having the effect of stifling innovation. Should the new proposal for 
Guidelines be accepted, this means that the hardcore restrictions in the 
TTBER must be taken into account in the assessment of these clauses. The 
TTBER contains a similar provision about non-compete clauses and 
distinguish clauses between competing undertakings, for which the benefit 
of the block-exemption for the entire agreement is withdrawn, and non-
competing undertakings, where only the exemption for the particular 
restriction is removed. A question worth considering is what the 
consequences of including a non-compete clause in the pooling context will 
be. Should the distinction between competing and non-competing 
undertakings also be considered in the individual assessment of the 
licensing agreement?   
 
Conclusively, non-challenge and termination clauses wish to counteract the 
risks stemming from the pool’s inherent feature to shield invalid patents. 
The current provision does not mention non-challenges clauses at all. 
Instead, the focus is on how far a termination clause can be taken. This must 
be considered quite odd as, in my opinion, the termination clause in no way 
enforce the incentives for licensees to challenge possible invalid patents. On 
the contrary, a termination clauses makes it even more likely to abstain from 
litigation. The fact that the proposed Guidelines adds a clearing statement 
that non-challenge clauses are within the scope of Article 101, is therefore 
positive. 
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6 Conclusion 
Creativity and innovation has grown to become one of the most crucial 
values of the European Union today. The reoccurring emphasis put on 
innovation in official speeches and initiatives, suggest that something more 
than just the traditional encouragement and safeguards is needed. The 
announcing of 2009 as the year of creativity and innovation further support 
this view. For the EU to rise from the financial crisis and secure its place as 
a leading world actor, able to meet the competition from the rest of the 
world, action must be taken to encourage and protect innovation. However, 
solely focusing on making the incentives for inventors stronger, will not be 
enough. These efforts are of marginal value as long as opposing forces are 
given the power to cut off the legs of all attempts to invent. It was against 
this background this thesis was commenced. 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine one of the possible solutions for 
furthering innovation, patent pools, and the main opponent for it, 
competition law. I started out by asking the question what competition 
policy on patent pools contained. Put differently, what conditions must be 
met for patent pools to be compatible with EU antitrust legislation? The 
answer to this initial question can be found in chapters four and five, or by 
examining the policy itself, and will not be reiterated here.  
 
What becomes clear when examining the current as well as proposed policy, 
is that the latter in most aspects corresponds with its predecessor. This 
finding is a bit surprising as the Guidelines’ section on patent pools 
allegedly is one where changes has been made. The fact that the new 
proposal doesn’t offer any larger changes can be perceived as the 
Commission being convinced that the current policy is satisfying. The 
inevitable question is whether they are right in this assumption. Is the 
framework fit to meet the challenges of today? In order to determine this, 
two questions were asked in the introduction to this thesis: are the 
established safeguards efficient in neutralizing the anti-competitive risks 
associated with patent pools? And further, does EU competition law policy 
sufficiently promote the formation of patent pools?  
 
On the subject of the existing safeguards’ efficiency, the following can be 
said. The legal situation for the pooling agreement is, if not messy, at least 
shattered and difficult to survey. A situation where a single agreement is 
entered into between the parties but some aspects of it are covered by the 
Guidelines, some by the TTBER per definition, others by the TTBER by 
analogy and some left to the TFEU, does not rhyme well with legal 
certainty.  This cannot be conceived as an efficient safeguard shaped after 
the   unique features and circumstances surrounding patent pools. For the 
rules to be efficient, a separate legal statute dealing with both the pooling 
agreement as well as the cross-licensing between members should be 
justified. Doing this would facilitate the creation of efficient provisions, 
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adapted for the specific nature of the pool. Another aspect of the policy is 
the actual content, more particularly the presumptions, found in the 
guidelines. As earlier discussed, the presumptions can be questioned in 
terms of their alleged effect on competition, both in that the behavior 
deemed anti-competitive not being as serious as suggested and that the 
safeguards constraining certain anti-competitive behavior not having the 
alleged effect. Both are a direct attack on the efficiency of the provisions. 
However, without case-law or more extensive empirical back up the 
criticism, it will be hard to motivate a change of the current provisions. 
 
As regards the efficiency of the framework for the licensing agreement, the 
same criticism as the one above, in terms of which provisions should apply 
to which agreements, could be argued. The recently proposed Guidelines 
however changes the scenery. By removing the benefit of the block 
exemption in full, the licensing agreements can more naturally be dealt with 
under the Guidelines. Although this might confer a heavier burden on the 
companies, this new system must be considered to be preferable from a 
legal certainty perspective. The policy on licensing agreements can 
furthermore be criticized in that the safeguards do not have the proposed 
effect on competition, and for this reason are unnecessary. In this regard, 
openness and non-discrimination are the requests hardest to motivate as 
their realization also mean the incentives for creating a pool to a large 
degree is lost. For grant-back clauses, it is natural that they, due to their 
possible anti-competitive effects of which all seems to agree, are limited. 
One can argue on whether essentiality is the most suitable criterion, but the 
fact that there is some kind of criterion guarantees that not all possible 
improvements are subject to grant-back obligations. For this reason, the 
criterion might be good enough. Finally, if the fear of patent pools shielding 
invalid patents should be taken seriously, then the proposed sentence on 
non-challenge clauses must be considered as far more efficient than the 
current restriction on termination clauses. In spite of this, the disincentive 
for challenging patents might be too big to be overcome by this sole rule. 
 
Continuing to the question on whether EU competition law policy 
sufficiently promotes the formation of patent pools, the question itself 
implies that patent pools have enough beneficial features to be promoted. 
This has been presupposed throughout the essay and must be considered as 
confirmed by the EU and US policies, international organizations and all of 
the examined doctrinal comments. In the author’s opinion, an important 
factor in determining whether a policy promotes a value, is the amount of 
restrictions of the phenomenon. If too many restrictions are established, then 
a principal statement that patent pools should be promoted has no actual 
effect. Also the transparency of the rules should be taken into account. The 
more legal uncertainty evolving the principles, the more risky of a project, 
and larger disincentives towards patent pooling can be expected. For the 
case of patent pools, it is not the amount of restrictions, but rather the 
difficulties in knowing which restrictions are applicable and the 
consequences of this that might threaten the creation of pools. The legal 
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uncertainty deters innovators from collaborating, as it is not worth the risk 
of the Commission suddenly coming knocking on the door.  
 
The answers to my questions seems to be that both the safeguard’s 
efficiency as well as the policy sufficiently promoting patent pools can be 
questioned. Against this background it would be interesting to ultimately 
elaborate a bit on how the policy could be altered to better fit the challenges 
of today. In order to overcome the uncertainties described above, the EU 
should consider collecting provisions dealing with all aspects of patent 
pools in one place. An unitary legal statute would be justified by the specific 
nature of the pooling arrangement and solve many issues regarding legal 
uncertainty. The form for which this unitary legal statute should be carried 
out, is a further question. From the author’s point of view there are two 
options. One possibility is for the EU to conclude that the current form is 
satisfactory and stay with the guideline format. An alternative and bolder 
move would be to introduce a new block exemption regulation for patent 
pools. The EU claims their insufficient experience on the area, prevents 
them from giving patent pools a green light.  The lack of experience 
however, could be a result of the uncertainties surrounding the legal 
situation for patent pools, discouraging companies from creating them. If 
the EU really believes in the pro-competitive benefits of patent pools and 
are serious about setting up ideal conditions for increasing the 
innovativeness, then they might have to be brave enough to let their 
competition guard down a bit. 
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